G E M Anscombe Intention

G.E.M. Anscombe and the Intention-Action Debate: A Deep Dive

G.E.M. Anscombe's work on intention, particularly her seminal essay "Intention," revolutionized philosophical discussions surrounding action, responsibility, and the mind. This article explores Anscombe's nuanced understanding of intention, its implications for understanding human behavior, and its enduring relevance in contemporary philosophy. We'll delve into her critique of earlier accounts, her own innovative approach, and the ongoing debates sparked by her insightful work. Understanding Anscombe's perspective provides a crucial foundation for analyzing the complexities of human action and the philosophical challenges surrounding free will and moral responsibility.

Introduction: The Problem of Intention

Before delving into Anscombe's contribution, it's crucial to understand the backdrop against which her work emerged. Philosophers prior to Anscombe grappled with defining "intention" in ways that often relied on mental states like desires, beliefs, and volitions. These accounts faced challenges in explaining how these mental states combined to produce intentional actions. For instance, simply desiring an outcome wasn't sufficient to classify an action as intentional; one needed some mechanism to connect desire with action. This is where Anscombe's critique becomes particularly relevant. She argued that these earlier accounts, relying heavily on a Cartesian framework, were fundamentally flawed.

Anscombe's Critique of Traditional Accounts

Anscombe launched a powerful critique of prevailing views on intention, primarily targeting the then-dominant approaches rooted in the work of thinkers like Hume and Kant. She rejected the idea of intention as a purely internal mental state, detached from the action itself. Anscombe challenged the notion that intentions could be neatly categorized as separate entities, causally linked to actions. Instead, she proposed a more holistic and integrated view.

One of her key criticisms was the reliance on the concept of causal explanation in understanding intentional action. Traditional accounts often sought to explain actions by identifying the causes preceding them – the mental states that supposedly "caused" the action. Anscombe argued that this approach misses the crucial element of intention itself. A purely causal account could just as easily explain involuntary actions, such as a reflex, as intentional actions. This was insufficient because it failed to capture the meaning or reason behind the action, which is essential to its intentional character.

She further criticized the separation of "doing" and "bringing about." Previous theories often treated these as distinct, with intentions focusing solely on the desired outcome (the "bringing about"). Anscombe highlighted the importance of the action itself ("doing"), emphasizing that the description of the action is inextricably linked to the agent's intention. The way an action is described, what it is intended as, is fundamentally crucial to understanding its intentional character.

Anscombe's Account of Intention: A Relational Approach

Anscombe's alternative approach emphasized the relational nature of intention. She argued against understanding intention as an isolated mental event; instead, it is fundamentally linked to the action itself and its description. She famously introduced the concept of "intention-in-action," emphasizing that intention is not simply a prior mental state but is constitutively linked to the action's execution. The action and its description are inseparable.

Here, Anscombe's concept of practical reasoning plays a crucial role. Intention, she argued, is not just a matter of wanting an outcome but is embedded within a broader context of practical reasoning. It involves understanding the means-end relationship, where the action serves as a means to achieve a desired end. This understanding is not just a detached intellectual grasp but is essential to the execution of the action itself. The action is understood by the agent as a means to achieve the desired end.

For instance, if someone intentionally lifts a glass of water to their lips, their action is not merely a physical movement. It's an action understood within a context of thirst, and the lifting of the glass is intended as a means of quenching thirst. The description of the action ("lifting the glass to drink") reflects the agent's intention.

The Importance of Description and "What One Does"

Anscombe's emphasis on the importance of description is central to her theory. The way an action is described depends heavily on the agent's intention. The same physical action can have different descriptions depending on the intended goal. Consider someone moving their hand. It could be described as "moving my hand," "writing my name," or "waving goodbye," each description reflecting a distinct intention. The description that accurately captures the agent's intention is crucial to understanding the action as intentional.

She also stresses the importance of understanding "what one does." This highlights the agent's perspective and the significance of their understanding of their action. It's not merely a question of what physical movements occur but of the agent's grasp of their action in relation to their intention. The agent's understanding of their action shapes the action itself, and that understanding is part of what makes the action intentional.

Knowledge, Skill, and Intention

Anscombe acknowledges the role of knowledge and skill in intentional action. An agent cannot perform an action intentionally unless they possess the necessary knowledge and skill to execute it successfully. This doesn't mean they need complete mastery; however, they need a sufficient understanding of what they're doing and the skill to carry it out.

The agent might not explicitly formulate their intentions in precise linguistic terms; the intention can be implicit in their understanding of what they are doing. This understanding shapes their action, influencing how it is perceived and interpreted.

The "Knowledge-How" and "Knowledge-That" Distinction

Anscombe's work also touches on the distinction between "knowledge-how" and "knowledge-that." "Knowledge-how" refers to practical knowledge, the skill or ability to perform an action. "Knowledge-that" is propositional knowledge, the knowledge of facts or truths. She emphasizes that intentional actions require both forms of knowledge, although they aren't necessarily explicitly articulated.

The agent needs the "knowledge-how" to execute the action and the "knowledge-that" to understand the context and implications of their action in relation to their intention.

Implications and Lasting Impact

Anscombe's work has had a profound and enduring impact on philosophy, particularly in the areas of action theory, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Her critique of traditional accounts and her alternative approach have stimulated considerable debate and further research.

Her relational approach to intention has influenced subsequent discussions on the nature of agency, free will, and moral responsibility. By emphasizing the importance of practical reasoning and the agent's understanding of their actions, Anscombe sheds light on the complexities of human behavior and the challenges of assigning moral responsibility.

Her work also raises important questions about the relationship between intention, action, and causation. The debate on whether intentions are causes of actions continues, with Anscombe's contributions providing a crucial framework for understanding the nuances of this complex relationship. Her emphasis on the descriptive aspect of actions and the importance of the agent's understanding of their actions has become a staple in contemporary action theory.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q: How does Anscombe's view on intention differ from previous accounts?

A: Unlike previous accounts that treated intention as a separate mental event causally linked to action, Anscombe emphasizes the relational nature of intention, linking it inextricably to the action itself and its description. She rejected the purely causal explanation of action, highlighting the role of practical reasoning and the agent's understanding of their action.

Q: What is the significance of "intention-in-action"?

A: "Intention-in-action" highlights that intention is not merely a prior mental state but is constitutively linked to the execution of the action. It's not something separate that causes the action; it's integral to the action itself.

Q: How does the description of an action relate to intention?

A: The description of an action is crucial because it reflects the agent's intention. The same physical action can have multiple descriptions depending on the intended goal, and choosing the right description is key to understanding the action as intentional.

Q: What is the role of practical reasoning in Anscombe's account?

A: Practical reasoning is central to understanding intention. It involves understanding the means-end relationship, where the action serves as a means to achieve a desired end. This understanding is not just intellectual but is integral to the execution of the action.

Q: How does Anscombe's work impact our understanding of moral responsibility?

A: Anscombe's work significantly impacts our understanding of moral responsibility. Her emphasis on the agent's understanding of their actions and the context in which those actions take place sheds light on the complexities of assigning moral blame or praise. Understanding the agent's intentions becomes crucial in determining moral responsibility.

Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of Anscombe's "Intention"

G.E.M. Anscombe's "Intention" remains a landmark contribution to philosophy. Her insightful critique of traditional accounts and her innovative relational approach to intention have profoundly shaped subsequent discussions on action, agency, and responsibility. Her emphasis on practical reasoning, the importance of action descriptions, and the agent's understanding of their actions continues to inspire debate and research, firmly establishing her legacy as a pivotal figure in contemporary philosophy. Understanding her work is not only essential for navigating the intricacies of action theory but also for appreciating the profound complexities of human behavior and the challenges of understanding intentionality itself. Her ideas continue to resonate, prompting ongoing exploration of the philosophical issues surrounding action, free will, and the human mind.